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Government Immunity from Local Zoning Restrictions:
The Balancing Test of Brownfield v. State
Courts frequently confront and resolve issues of government immunity
from local zoning restrictions.' In some circumstances, the proper judicial
resolution of the issue is clearly settled. For example, activities of the federal
government are immune from local zoning restrictions under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution,2 and in cases involving activities of a
state, its authorized agents, or its political subdivisions 3 the state legislature
may provide by statutory enactment that an activity is not subject to local
zoning restrictions.4 This Case Comment is concerned with the more difficult
cases that arise when the legislature provides no clear answer to the question
whether a state activity is immune from local zoning restrictions.5 Statutes
authorizing state activities are usually silent on the subject of state immunity
from local zoning restrictions, and the absence of express legislative solutions
has "led to a rash of litigation arising from the attempts of municipalities to
enforce their zoning ordinances ... against other state agencies, and of the
agencies to obtain immunity to these regulations."-
6
State courts have developed a number of approaches for resolving con-
flicts between state activities and local zoning restrictions when the conflicts
are not clearly resolved by legislative enactments. Traditionally, the courts
have held state activities to be immune from local zoning restrictions when
the activities can be either classified as "governmental," rather than "pro-
prietary," 7 or supported by the power of eminent domain.8 In Brownfield v.
State,9 the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected these traditional approaches and
I. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415,419-20 (3rd Cir. 1944). See
generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.07 (2d ed. 1976).
3. In this Case Comment, "state" is an inclusive reference to the state, its authorized agents, and its
political subdivisions, unless the context dictates a narrower meaning. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282,
407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980), appears to adopt a similar view. In the only decision applying Brownfield, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio for the Eighth District strongly intimated that Brownfield's balancing of public interests test is
applicable to all "conflict[s] between the right of one governmental unit to condemn and use [land] and another
to zone." Board of Educ. v. Puck, No. 999,280, slip op. at 5 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980).
Applying a single test to resolve all intergovernmental conflicts between zoning regulations and land use,
without regard for the unit of government imposing the regulations or proposing the land use, appears preferable
to allowing the class of governmental units to determine the applicable test. See, e.g., note 199 and accompany-
ing text infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 215-24 infra.
5. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282,407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980), fits within this rubric because the state
acquired and did not construct the halfway house. See text accompanying note 223 infra.
6. Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49
MINN. L. REV. 284, 285 (1964).
7. See text accompanying notes 138-66 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 31-88 infra.
9. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
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adopted a balancing of governmental interests test to resolve issues of state
immunity from local zoning restrictions. This Case Comment compares the
Brownfield balancing test with the traditional judicial approaches to the
immunity issue. The Comment focuses on conceptual and practical difficul-
ties with both the eminent domain test and the governmental-proprietary use
distinction and concludes that the Brownfield balancing test is a preferable
method for resolving conflicts between state activities and local zoning re-
strictions.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING OF BROWNFIELD V. STATE
Brownfield involved a dispute between the state of Ohio, as lessor and
owner of a halfway house for patients discharged from a psychiatric hospital,
and property owners living close to the proposed facility. The facility was a
single-family residence purchased by the state for the purpose of reestablish-
ing "basic living skills for those who have been institutionalized for long
periods of time."' No more than five residents, together with a resident
manager, were to live in the facility at any given time. The resident manager
was to be employed by Western Reserve Psychiatric Services, Inc., the
lessee. The state, as lessor and owner, was to be responsible for maintenance
and the facility's proper operation.
The plaintiff-appellants" in Brownfield sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, claiming the operation of the facility would violate a city zoning or-
dinance restricting the area in which the facility was located to single-family
residential uses. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants,' 2 permit-
ting operation of the facility under the local zoning restrictions.13 The judg-
ment was supported by the trial court's alternative holdings that the proposed
halfway house was a permitted use in an area zoned single-family residential 4
and that the facility was immune from local zoning restrictions under the
eminent domain test.' 5 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding
that the facility was immune from local zoning restrictions under the eminent
domain test and did not reach the question whether a halfway house is a
permitted use in an area zoned single-family residential. 6
In the supreme court, the principle issue was "whether a privately-
operated, state-owned facility is automatically exempt from municipal zoning
10. Id. at 282, 407 N.E.2d at 1365.
11. Plaintiff-appellants in Brownfield were the city of Akron and "owners of property in close proximity to
the" proposed halfway house. Id., 407 N.E.2d at 1366. The city of Akron was not an original party-plaintiff in
the trial court. Plaintiff property owners named the city of Akron as a defendant in their original action and the
trial court realigned the city as a party-plaintiff at the city's request. Id. at 283 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 1366 n.l.
12. Defendants in the trial court and defendant-appellees in the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of
Ohio were the State of Ohio, the Akron Superintendent of Building Inspection and Regulation, and Western
Reserve Psychiatric Services, Inc. Id. at 282-83, 407 N.E.2d at 1366.
13. Brownfield v. State, No. 77-12-2995 (Summit County, Ohio, C.P. June 12, 1978).
14. Id. at 10-11.
15. Id. at 7-9.
16. Brownfield v. State, Nos. 8991 and 8992, slip op. at 7-10 (9th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio May 2, 1979).
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restrictions.' ' 17 Defendant-appellees urged the court to resolve this issue
under the eminent domain test, the traditional approach of the Ohio courts for
resolving issues of state immunity from local zoning restrictions. 8 Plaintiff-
appellants urged the court to resolve the dispute under the governmental-
proprietary use distinction.'9 The court rejected both approaches and em-
braced a balancing of public interests test for resolving issues of state im-
munity from local zoning restrictions.2 Without reaching the issue whether
operation of the proposed halfway house was immune from local zoning re-
strictions, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and re-
manded the case 2 The reversal and remand were based on alternative find-
ings by the supreme court that the court of appeals failed "to pass on appel-
lants' contention that the trial court erred in finding the proposed halfway
house to be a permitted use in a single-family residential district"22 and "the
state of Ohio made no effort to comply with the ... [local] zoning ordinance"
or consider "the impact of the proposed halfway house upon the surrounding
neighborhood."'
Brownfield is the first controlling Ohio case explicitly adopting the bal-
ancing of public interests test for the resolution of conflicts between state
activities and local zoning restrictions. 24 The test provides that when a state
activity conflicts with local zoning restrictions and the conflict is not resolved
by a "direct statutory grant of immunity" for the activity, the state must make
"a reasonable attempt to comply with the zoning restrictions of the affected
17. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 284, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
20. Id. at 284-86, 407 N.E.2d at 1367-68. Before reaching the zoning immunity issue, the court addressed a
jurisdictional challenge raised by the state of Ohio and dismissed the state as a party to the cause. The state's
contention was that it could not be "subjected to suit in its own courts absent its consent." Id. at 283, 407
N.E.2d at 1366. In spite of the dismissal of the state of Ohio as a party, the issue remained "whether a
privately-operated, state-owned facility is automatically exempt from municipal zoning restrictions." Id. at 284,
407 N.E.2d at 1367. Thus, Brownfield's holding clearly extends to state-owned facilities.
In general, when state courts apply doctrines of state immunity from local zoning restrictions, the courts
tend not to distinguish between facilities owned and operated by the state and state-owned facilities operated by
private individuals or organizations to serve a public purpose. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 1187 (1978).
The result in one early Ohio case suggests local zoning restrictions are inapplicable to the activities of state-
regulated public utilities vested with the public power of eminent domain. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Gale,
119 Ohio St. 110, 162 N.E. 385 (1928), and text accompanying notes 45-53 infra. But see State ex rel. Kearns v.
Ohio Power Co., 163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E.2d 394 (1955). In Kearns, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
authority of a county planning commission extends to the construction of electric power lines by a state
regulated public utility. The power company argued that it should not be subject to the authority of the
commission, basing this argument on the holding of State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E.
330 (1927) (erection of a bridge or viaduct by county pursuant to state law not subject to municipal zoning
restrictions). The Kearns court rejected the power company's argument on the grounds that Blakemore "dealt
with the right of an agency of the state government under express statutory authority to construct a
viaduct.., and [was] hardly in point." 163 Ohio St. 451,462, 127 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1955) (emphasis in original).
21. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 287, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Prior to Brownfield, Ohio courts subscribed to the eminent domain test to resolve issues of state
immunity from local zoning restrictions. See text accompanying notes 34-88 infra. However, one court of
appeals seems to have subscribed to a balancing test. See Board of Park Comm'rs v. Bay Village, 78 Ohio L.
Abs. 389, 131 N.E.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1957).
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political subdivision. '" If the state cannot achieve compliance with local
zoning restrictions after reasonable efforts, the issue of the state's immunity
from local zoning restrictions is resolved by weighing the public interests
served by the proposed state activity against the public interests served by
enforcing the local zoning restriction.
26
The balancing of public interests test adopted in Brownfield differs sub-
stantially from traditional judical approaches to the immunity question under
the eminent domain test and the governmental-proprietary use distinction.
Judicial resolution of the immunity issue under these traditional approaches is
based on factors wholly unrelated to the public interests served by local
zoning restrictions.
2 7
II. THE EMINENT DOMAIN TEST AND THE
GOVERNMENTAL-PROPIETARY USE DISTINCTION
Brownfield explicitly rejected the eminent domain test and the govern-
mental-proprietary use distinction. The eminent domain test was rejected
because its underlying rationale-that public interests are superior to private
interests-is irrelevant to the resolution of intergovernmental conflicts. 29 The
governmental-proprietary use distinction was rejected in Brownfield because
it is difficult to apply and relies on criteria that do not reflect "the realities of
governmental activity. '3Y An examination of cases applying the eminent
domain test and the governmental-proprietary use distinction confirms the
reasoning underlying Brownfield's rejection of these tests and reveals ad-
ditional problems with these traditional judicial approaches to the immunity
question.
A. Ohio's Traditional Eminent Domain Test
Ohio courts have traditionally resolved issues of state immunity from
local zoning restrictions by resorting to an eminent domain test.3 ' Under this
test, state activities are absolutely immune32 from local zoning restrictions if
the activities are conducted on land that was or could have been acquired by
appropriation.33
25. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
26. Id. at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
27. See text accompanying notes 31-88 and 134-66 infra.
28. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 284-86, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367-68 (1980).
29. Id. at 284-85, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
30. Id. at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
31. "The view has gained some ascendancy, notably in Georgia and Ohio, that zoning ordinaces are
inapplicable to governmental projects for the construction of which the agency in question has the power to
condemn or appropriate lands by the power of eminent domain." Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 978 (1958).
32. But see text accompanying notes 68-74 infra.
33. The cases do not require that land actually be acquired by the process of appropriation. See, e.g., City
of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Auth., 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (Licking County C.P.
1967) (county airport expansion on land donated by industry immune from local zoning restrictions). This
sweeping rule can be defended on the ground that government would simply appropriate the land in question if
the rule were drawn more narrowly. See generally City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 398-99,
368 P.2d 637, 640 (1962).
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1. Evolution of the Eminent Domain Test in Ohio
The origins of Ohio's common law eminent domain test are found in
cases involving disputes that arose between private landowners and the state
when the state's proposed use of land violated private covenants in deeds of
sale. The earliest Ohio decision involving an alleged breach of a private
covenant by an agent of the state possessing powers of eminent domain is
Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Railway?4 In Doan, plaintiff owned and re-
sided upon a lot in a residential development 5 The lot was originally part of a
larger tract of land owned by a developer who had subdivided the tract into
lots and placed in the deed of sale for each lot a covenant restricting use of the
lot to residential purposes.3 6 Defendant railroad, a public utility invested by
the state with the power of eminent domain, purchased several lots in the
development and extended a freight line on the purchased land 7 Plaintiff
fied an action for damages based on defendant's use of the lots in a manner
contrary to the convenants in plaintiff's and defendant's deeds of sale 8 The
trial court rendered judgment for defendant and the court of appeals
affirmed3
The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the question whether a public
utility invested with powers of eminent domain could be subject to the private
covenants in the deeds of sale.o Affirming the lower courts, the supreme
court characterized defendant's use of the lots for railway purposes as a
"public purpose" 4' and held that restrictive covenants in deeds of sale "can-
not be construed as applying to the state or any of its agencies vested with the
power of eminent domain in the use of lots for public purposes." 42 Plaintiff's
prayer for damages was dismissed on the ground that "where a company or
any agency of the state vested with the right of eminent domain has acquired
lots in ... an allotment and is using the same for public purposes, no claim
for damages arises in favor of the owners of the other lots on account of such
use." 43 The rationale for the decision in Doan was that the power of eminent
domain is designed to serve public purposes that are superior to the private
interests served by the restrictive covenants.44
34. 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915). On the same day it decided Doan, the court also issued a brief per
curiam decision in Ward v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N.E. 507 (1915). Ward involved facts
precisely parallel to Doan, and the court disposed of the case relying solely on Doan's eminent domain rationale.
Id. at 472, 112 N.E. at 508.
35. 92 Ohio St. 461, 461-62, 112 N.E. 505, 505 (1915).
36. Id. at 462-63, 112 N.E. at 505.
37. Id. at 465, 112 N.E. at 506.
38. Id. at 466, 112 N.E. at 506. Plaintiffs theory was that "'defendant has taken possession of and is
occupying and using the private property and interest in land of the plaintiff," the property interest being the
covenants running with all the lots. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 468, 112 N.E. at 506.
41. Id. at 470, 112 N.E. at 507.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 461, 112 N.E. at 505.
44. The court noted, "The right of eminent domain rests upon public necessity, and a contract or covenant
or plan of allotment which attempts to prevent the exercise of that right is clearly against public policy and is
therefore illegal and void." Id. at 468-69, 112 N.E. at 507.
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Norfolk & Western Railway v. Gale45 represents the first extension of
Doan to situations involving public zoning restrictions. In Gale, a railroad,
acting through its subsidiary holding company, "purchased certain property
in the Eastgate addition to the city of Columbus." 46 All deeds of sale for
property in the Eastgate addition contained covenants restricting use of the
property to residential purposes.47 Defendant railroad proposed to use its
Eastgate property for nonresidential purposes,4 and plaintiffs, owners of re-
sidential property in the Eastgate addition, brought suit seeking an injunction
prohibiting nonresidential use of the railroad's property. Plaintiffs' position
was that the injunction should remain in effect until defendant acquired plain-
tiffs' property rights in the restrictive covenants through the exercise of de-
fendant's powers of eminent domain.4 9 In an amended petition to the trial
court, plaintiffs also cited various provisions of the Columbus zoning ordi-
nance "regulating the location, use, and height of structures. 50 The trial
court refused to grant the injunction sought by plaintiffs, but the court of
appeals reversed.
5
'
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals "under the rule an-
nounced in the Doan case.",52 The only reference in the court's opinion to
plaintiffs' reliance on provisions of the Columbus zoning ordinance appears in
the recitation of facts. The court noted, "The amendment to... [plaintiffs']
petition also sets up the zoning ordinance of the city of Columbus, regulating
the location, use, and height of structures, and premises and the area of lots
and yards, passed August 6, 1923, which it is claimed relates to the property in
question. 53 The court did not explicitly hold that the provisions of the zoning
ordinance were inapplicable to the railroad's property, and the opinion offers
no rationale for extending Doan's reasoning to cases involving public zoning
restrictions rather than private covenants. Nonetheless, Gale is significant
because, given the facts of the case, the result sub silencio bridged the gap
between the use of the eminent domain test in situations involving private
covenants and its use in situations involving local zoning ordinances.
The first Ohio case that expressly extended the eminent domain test to
situations involving public zoning ordinances was Helsel v. Board of County
Commissioners.54 Helsel involved a dispute between a private landowner and
Cuyahoga County over the county's acquisition of a private airport. The
airport was located in two villages, both of which passed zoning ordinances
45. 119 Ohio St. 110, 162 N.E. 385 (1928).
46. Id. at 110, 162 N.E. at 385.
47. Id. at 112, 162 N.E. at 385.
48. The court noted that "the land is to be used for the purposes of a railroad yard, railroad switching
tracks, offices, and other purposes incident to a railroad yard." Id. at 11l, 162 N.E. at 385.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 112, 162 N.E. at 385.
51. Id., 162 N.E. at 386.
52. Id. at 113, 162 N.E. at 386.
53. Id. at 112, 162 N.E. at 385.
54. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947), affd, 83 Ohio App. 388,78 N.E.2d 694,
appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948).
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that restricted the airport land within their boundaries to residential use.55
Moreover, a federal court had enjoined private operation of the airport "on
the ground that said use constituted a nuisance." 56 The voters of Cuyahoga
County passed a referendum authorizing the issuance of bonds to finance the
acquisition of a site for a county airport, and the board of county commis-
sioners resolved to appropriate the private airport property for this purpose.57
Plaintiff, a taxpayer and property owner in one of the villages and the plaintiff
in the earlier nuisance action in federal court, sought to enjoin the sale of
bonds for airport construction and to require the county to reconvey the land
to its original owners.58 Among the arguments advanced by the plaintiff was
that the village zoning ordinances prohibited the use of the airport property
for nonresidential purposes.5 9 The trial court rejected this argument and held
that the county's use of the land for a public airport was immune from local
zoning restrictions because the land was acquired by appropriation. 6° The
court relied on Doan, Gale, and Cincinnati v. Wegehoft6 l for the proposition
that "restrictions in zoning ordinances of municipalities are ineffective to
prevent the use of land by a county for the public purpose for which it has
been appropriated." 62 The court of appeals affirmed, finding itself "in full
accord" with the reasoning of the trial court.63
Two aspects of Helsel are significant. First, because Helsel was the first
Ohio case explicitly extending the eminent domain test to conflicts between
state activities and local zoning restrictions, the trial court offered a rationale
for resolving such conflicts by this test. The rationale focused on the justifica-
tion for subjecting private land use activities to local zoning restrictions and
demonstrated that this justification does not support the application of zoning
restrictions to state activities.64 The court indicated that the application of
zoning restrictions to private property rests "on the theory that ... [zoning
restrictions] bear a real and substantial relation to the public welfare" and on
"the principle that the exercise of rights incident to the ownership of private
property may be restricted in the interests of the general welfare." 65 Situa-
tions involving the application of zoning ordinances to public property and
55. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 58, 79 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
56. Id. The federal court opinion was Swetland v. Curtis-Wright, Inc., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
57. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 58, 79 N.E.2d 698, 700-01 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
58. Id. at 59, 79 N.E.2d at 701.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 61-62, 79 N.E.2d at 704-05.
61. 119 Ohio St. 136, 162 N.E. 389 (1928). In Wegehoft, the Supreme Court of Ohio approved a provision in
a municipal zoning ordinance enacted by the city of Cincinnati. The provision exempted the city's buildings
from zoning restrictions. In dicta the court stated that the provision exempting the city's buildings "was not at
all necessary in order to clothe the city with the power to acquire property upon which to erect necessary public
buildings in the restricted residential zone." Id. at 137, 162 N.E. at 390. Helsel interprets this language as a
reference to zoning immunity based on the city's power of eminent domain. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698,
704 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
62. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
63. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 83 Ohio App. 388, 392, 78 N.E.2d 694, 695 (1947).
64. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 61-62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 704-05 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
65. Id. at 62, 79 N.E.2d at 705.
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activities were distinguishable because "the presumption is that the use of
public property for public purposes is designed to promote the general welfare
also. "66 This reasoning, coupled with the court's reliance on Doan, Gale, and
Wegehoft, formed the basis for the court's holding.67
The second significant aspect of Helsel is its clear departure from the rule
of absolute immunity set forth in other Ohio cases applying the eminent
domain test.6' Under the rule of absolute immunity, the only inquiry for the
court is whether the state activity is supported by the power of eminent
domain. If state law authorizes the appropriation of land for the activity, the
activity is immune from local zoning restrictions and the court's inquiry is
ended.69 Helsel's rule of qualified immunity extends the court's inquiry a step
further. Under Helsel, not only must the state's activity be supported by the
power of eminent domain, but the state must also take account of the nature
of the neighborhood in which it proposes to undertake an activity.70 Some
neighborhoods are "palpably unsuited to the proposed public use" and pri-
vate property is protected by law "from the encroachment of public works
constituting or creating nuisances."' According to the Helsel opinion,
"These matters involve a want of good faith on the part of administrative
public officials in the selection of locations and in all such cases appropriate
relief will be granted by the courts. 72 The trial court did not grant the injunc-
tive relief sought by the plaintiff in Helsel because "[n]o evidence of bad faith
on the part of the county commissioners in selecting the site" for the airport
was shown 3 The court concluded that the county commissioners had acted
in good faith because the airport site was located in a sparsely settled area and
"it [did] not appear that the use of the site as an airport [would] constitute an
intrusion upon highly developed residential sections." 74
The Supreme Court of Ohio firmly embraced the eminent domain test for
the first time in Ohio Turnpike Commission v. Allen. 75 Allen, the secretary-
66. Id.
67. Id., 79 N.E.2d at 704. Helsel also relied on the persuasive authority of Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker,
368 IU. 442, 14 N.E.2d 490 (1938), which held that a park district may condemn land and put it to use as a park in
an area zoned residential, and In Petition of the City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 480, 14 N.W.2d 140 (1939), in which a
township ordinance prohibiting the use of land for an airport was held unenforceable because it conflicted with a
state statute authorizing the acquisition of land for the airport. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Cuyahoga
County C.P. 1947).
68. See State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied sub
nom. Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S. 865 (1952). Allen, the only case decided by the Supreme
Court of Ohio under the eminent domain test, makes no inquiry into the good faith of the state. See text
accompanying notes 75-80 infra.
69. See State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied sub
nom. Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S. 865 (1952).
70. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Cuyahoga County C.P.
1947).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied sub nom. Baduffv. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S.
865 (1952).
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treasurer of the Ohio Turnpike Commission, refused "to seal and attest cer-
tain revenue bonds and a trust agreement securing them." 76 Relator, the Ohio
Turnpike Commission, invoked the original jurisdiction of the supreme court,
seeking a writ of mandamus compelling Allen to seal and attest the bonds and
trust agreement?7 Allen filed an answer questioning the constitutionality of
the statutes authorizing the issuance of the bonds and "the propriety of
certain actions taken by the ... [Ohio Turnpike Commission] in connection
therewith. 7 8 One of the improprieties alleged in respondent Allen's answer
was that the portion of the turnpike to be financed with bond proceeds would
"pass through territory that has been zoned and that this will constitute a use
in violation of the zoning ordinances." 79 The supreme court summarily dis-
missed this contention, citing Doan and Gale.0
The most recent Ohio authority on the eminent domain test is the lower
court case of City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Authority. , In
Heath, the city brought an action to enjoin the airport authority from expand-
ing an existing airport.82 The authority had the power of eminent domain and
could have acquired the land for airport expansion by appropriation, even
though the land actually was donated to the authority.83 The city claimed,
inter alia, that expansion of the airport was prohibited by a city zoning ordi-
nance. The original airport site was zoned residential and the land donated for
the expansion industrial.84 These zoning restrictions clearly prohibited use of
the donated land for airport purposes.85 The court, relying on Helsel, held the
airport authority immune from local zoning restrictions under the eminent
domain test.8 6 Further support was drawn from reliance on Allen, Doan, and
Gale.Y7
The line of cases from Doan through Heath illustrates the complete ev-
olution of the eminent domain test from a rule for resolving conflicts between
private land use restrictions and state activities to a rule for resolving conflicts
between public zoning restrictions and state activities. In Brownfield, the
supreme court concluded that judicial resolution of "intergovernmental
conflicts" under the eminent domain test is unjustified. 8
2. Critical Analysis of the Eminent Domain Test
The starting point for an analysis of the eminent domain test is the rea-
soning Brownfield offers for refusing to apply this traditional approach to
76. 158 Ohio St. 168, 169, 107 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1952).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 174, 107 N.E.2d at 350.
80. Id.
81. 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (Licking County C.P. 1967).
82. Id. at 70, 237 N.E.2d at 174.
83. Id. at 70-71, 237 N.E.2d at 174-75.
84. Id., 237 N.E.2d at 175.
85. Id. at 70, 237 N.E.2d at 175.
86. Id. at 77-78, 237 N.E.2d at 177-79.
87. Id. at 76-77, 237 N.E.2d at 178-79.
88. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
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questions of state immunity from local zoning restrictions. In Brownfield, the
court focused on the evolutionary development of the eminent domain test
and concluded the reasoning of Doan was inapplicable to "intergovernmental
conflicts." 89 In holding restrictive covenants subordinate to the power of
eminent domain, the Doan court reasoned that the "right to eminent domain
rests upon public necessity," which is superior to rights incident to the pri-
vate ownership of property.90 Brownfield correctly concluded that this public
necessity rationale, while a sufficient basis for subordinating private rights to
public interests, is an ineffective basis for resolving conflicts between public
purposes. The public necessity rationale of Doan draws no distinctions be-
tween public purposes. Rather, the rationale distinguishes public purposes
from private property interests and subordinates certain private interests to
the general welfare.9' "Both the municipality's exercise of its zoning powers
and the state's exercise of the power of eminent domain are intended to
effectuate public purposes." 92 The real question is which public purpose
ought to be deemed superior. The proposition of Doan that public necessity is
superior to private rights does not answer this question.93
Brownfield's analysis of the eminent domain test illustrates a flaw in
Helsel's rationale for applying Doan's eminent domain test to conflicts be-
tween state activities and local zoning restrictions. The point of departure in
Helsel was the trial court's examination of the municipal zoning power.
94
Doan concluded that private interests in land are subordinate to the power of
eminent domain because the power of the state to appropriate land serves
public purposes.95 Helsel concluded that the municipal zoning power, though
superior to private interests in land, is not superior to the power of eminent
domain.96 The power of eminent domain serves public, not private, purposes,
and this characteristic places the power of appropriation in the same category
with the zoning power under Doan's distinction between private interests and
public purposes.97 Basing its conclusion on the foregoing analysis, Helsel held
that the power of eminent domain is superior to the zoning power.9 The
difficulty with Helsel is that the trial court's reasoning establishes only that
89. Id.
90. 92 Ohio St. 461, 468-69, 112 N.E. 505, 507 (1915).
91. Id.
92. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
93. The flaw in extending Doan to situations involving public zoning ordinances is that such an extension
equates the ordinances with private restrictive covenants. In State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158
Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied sub nom. Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S. 865 (1952),
"[t]he court... assumed that private development restrictions are the same as city zoning ordinances."
Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316, 325 n.62
(1961).
94. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 61-62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 704-05 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
95. 92 Ohio St. 461, 468-69, 112 N.E. 505, 506-07 (1915).
96. 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
97. "Zoning ordinances are upheld on the theory that they bear a real and substantial relation to the public
welfare .... but the presumption is that the use of public property for public purposes is designed to promote
the general welfare also." Id.
98. Id.
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public interests are superior to private rights, not that one public interest is
superior to another. Thus, Helsel's analysis fails to justify application of the
eminent domain test in conflicts between the power to zone and the power to
appropriate land.
Though Helsel's central line of reasoning fails to provide a clear basis for
preferring the public interests served by eminent domain to those served by
local zoning restrictions, other language in the opinion suggests an alternative
basis for subordinating the zoning power to the power of appropriation. Prior
to announcing its central line of reasoning, the court presented a brief analysis
of the power of eminent domain, characterizing it as "an inherent and neces-
sary attribute of sovereignty, existing independently of constitutional pro-
visions.' 99 The eminent domain power "antedates constitutions and legisla-
tive enactments and exists independently of constitutional sanction or provi-
sions, which are only declaratory of previously existing universal law."'m
Implied in this discussion is the principle that the eminent domain power is
superior to the zoning power because the eminent domain power is an "attri-
bute of sovereignty.' ' 0 ' Even if the eminent domain power is an attribute of
sovereignty and the zoning power flows from some other source-the state
constitution, for example'02-the Helsel court failed to explain why this dis-
tinction should count as a reason for subordinating the zoning power to the
power of appropriation.' 3 More important, however, is the fact that the zon-
ing and eminent domain powers are both "inherent attributes of the sovereign
states"' 4 and indistinguishable in terms of their source. Moreover, the reason
for the existence of both is that these powers serve public interests-one by
taking property and the other by regulating its use.'05
In addition to the absence of sound theoretical or historical underpin-
nings for the eminent domain test's distinction between the public powers of
zoning and appropriation, the test is overbroad in application.' °6 Under the
99. Id. at 61, 79 N.E.2d at 704.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980) (zoning power of a
municipality is a police power granted by state constitution).
103. By its own language, the Helsel court admits that state constitutions are the operative source of the
eminent domain power and of sufficient force to limit this "'attribute of sovereignty." 37 Ohio Op. 58, 61, 79
N.E.2d 698, 704 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
104. Scottsdale v. Municipal Court. 90 Ariz. 393, 400, 368 P.2d 637, 641 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
105. Sackman, The Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each Other, in INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 107 (1971).
106. The essence of the overbreadth criticism is that courts apply the eminent domain test before admini-
strative processes that may result in an accommodation between state and local interests are given the opportun-
ity to run their course. In theory, the test can also be criticized as too restrictive in granting immunity. A state
activity of substantial worth and urgency might not be supported by the power of eminent domain, in which case
local zoning restrictions could effectively prohibit the state from undertaking the activity. This problem arises in
theory only. The Ohio General Assembly has enacted eminent domain statutes for a virtually endless variety of
state activities. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 152.21,306.04, 306.36, 307.08, 308.07, 511.04, 511.24, 517.01,
713.03, 719.01, 719.031, 743.34, 755.08, 759.48, 991.07, 1501.01, 1523.11, 1523.20, 1545.11, 1711.14, 1721.01,
1721.03, 1721.05, 1723.02, 1743.06, 1743.07, 3313.39, 3333.08, 3735.11, 3735.32, 3706.17, 4582.06, 4957.04,
4957.23, 4981.07, 5507.17, 5516.08, 5537.06, 5543.12, 5543.13, 5549.04, 5551.04, 5551.06, 5551.07, 5553.10,
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rule of the eminent domain test, local zoning restrictions are subordinated to
all state activities supported by the power of eminent domain. °7 The courts
do not inquire whether the conflict between local zoning restrictions and a
state activity can be resolved by means less drastic than holding the state
activity absolutely immune from the zoning power 38 As Brownfield illus-
trates, the absence of any judicial inquiry into less drastic alternatives for
resolving conflicts between the zoning and eminent domain powers is the
source of unjustified overbroad applications of the eminent domain test.
In Brownfield, there was a real possibility that the state could have oper-
ated the proposed halfway house in compliance with local zoning restrictions.
The local zoning ordinance permitted the operation of a "lodging-house or
hostel conducted for rehabilitation" as a conditional use in areas zoned single-
family residential.' 9 A conditional use is permitted upon the issuance of a
conditional use permit by local zoning authorities."l The state did not apply
for a conditional use permit in Brownfield, but had application been made by
the state and had the local zoning authority issued a conditional use permit for
the halfway house, the conflict between local zoning restrictions and the
halfway house would have disappeared."' Because Brownfield was remanded
for further consideration by the court of appeals on the ground that the state
failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the local zoning ordinance,
5553.11, 5553.43, 5555.09, 5555.27, 5559.06, 5561.11, 5573.02, 5591.13, 5591.39, 5593.08, 59711.05, 6101.18,
6103.25, 6115.22, 6117.39, 6117.48, 6119.11, 6121.041, and 6151.02 (Page 1980).
The extensive number of agencies and activities supported by the power of eminent domain is a central
factor in the overbreadth problem:
The extensive proliferation of state agencies authorized to condemn further exacerbates the problem.
A grant of absolute immunity to all such governmental units would subjugate a community's attempt to
coordinate rationally its land-use planning to the land-use decisions of myriad state agencies, often
both unresponsive to the desires of the local citizenry and ill-equipped to make comprehensive land-
use decisions. If governmental units are assured of absolute immunity, there is no need to comply with
the prescribed zoning procedures for obtaining exemptions; thus, adversely affected landowners may
be completely denied any opportunity to voice their objections to the location of the institutional
facility. Moreover, when eminent domain power automatically immunizes a governmental unit from
zoning regulation, there is no institutional incentive to comply with local zoning ordinances and no
sanction other than adverse public opinion for irresponsible land-use decisions.
Note, Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869, 876 (1971).
107. See text accompanying notes 31-88 supra.
108. But see note 68 and text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
109. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
110. See generally 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25. 159 & 25.160 (3d ed. 1976).
Conditional use permits differ from variances in two respects. First, conditional uses are enumerated in the local
zoning ordinance. The enumeration represents the judgment of the local legislative authority that an enumerated
form of conditional use may often, but not always, be compatible with the general scheme of zoning foran area.
The factual judgment of compatibility is an administrative decision. The decision to grant a variance is also
administrative, but a variance may be granted for a use not specifically enumerated in the local zoning ordi-
nance.
Second, the standard applied in the administrative decision to grant a conditional use is not as strict as the
standard for variances. Since variances are granted for uses that clearly depart from the local zoning scheme, a
showing of unnecessary hardship is required. In other words, enforcement of the existing zoning scheme must
generate a hardship that can be relieved only by varying the local zoning scheme. By contrast, a conditional use
permit is granted on the lesser showing of substantial public service or convenience from the conditional use.
This lesser showing is justified because the legislature has narrowed the discretion of the administrative author-
ity by enumerating conditional uses in the zoning ordinance. Id.
111. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
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resolution of the conflict in the case may yet occur by the issuance of a
conditional use permit." 2 Had Brownfield been decided by the supreme court
under the eminent domain test, the court would not have inquired into the
authority of the city to issue a conditional use permit because the inquiry
would have been totally unnecessary. Operation of the halfway house in
Brownfield is supported by the power of eminent domain, 3 and the supreme
court, on the basis of this fact, would presumably have held the facility
immune from local zoning restrictions.
Judicial resolution of conflicts under the eminent domain test prior to the
exhaustion of less drastic nonjudicial alternatives forecloses the possibility of
nonjudicial conflict resolution. A rule requiring the exhaustion of administra-
tive alternatives before resort to the courts enhances the possibility that the
parties to a conflict will reach an accommodation that serves the public inter-
ests underlying both the zoning power and the state's activity." 4 For ex-
ample, were the state to apply for a conditional use permit for its proposed
halfway house, the administrative process for granting the permit would serve
as a vehicle for accommodation between the state and local zoning author-
ities. The exchange of accurate information and ensuing discussions between
the parties might eliminate local misconceptions regarding the nature of the
state's proposed use, clarify issues and concerns on both sides, and reveal
fertile ground for compromise that would otherwise remain uncultivated."5
Total compromise by one party might occur if the zoning authority concludes
its concerns are totally unfounded and issues a conditional use permit or the
state concludes the concerns of the zoning authority are substantial and legit-
imate and decides not to pursue its proposed use at the controversial site. The
more likely possibility is that both the state and the local zoning authority
would compromise on some concerns. The zoning authority could, for ex-
ample, issue a conditional use permit with one or more attached conditions" 6
112. See text accompanying notes 228-34 infra.
113. The Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation was the state agency responsible for
the proposed halfway house. Section 5121.17, Ohio Revised Code, vested the Department with the following
powers of eminent domain:
When it is necessary for a state benevolent, correctional, or penal institution to acquire any real
estate, right of way or easement in real estate in order to accomplish the purposes for which it was
organized or is being conducted, and the department of mental health and mental retardation or the
department of rehabilitation and correction is unable to agree with the owner of such property upon the
price to be paid therefor, such property may be appropriated in the manner provided for the appropria-
tion of property for other state purposes.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5121.17 (Page Supp. 1980) (current version at 1980 Ohio Laws, H.B. No. 900 (to be
codified in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.37)).
114. In addition, ignoring established administrative procedures undermines public confidence in the
zoning process. Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869, 876
n.34 (1971).
115. In Brownfield, for example, there was disagreement between the parties as to the number of residents
who would live in the halfway house at any given time. The court noted that "the halfway house will serve as a
home for no more than five residents," 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1365 (1980), but appellants
presented convincing evidence that the residential capacity at the facility was twice that size. Brief of Appellants
at 3, 12-13, Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
116. See 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.160 (3d ed. 1976).
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The conditions would require the state to modify certain aspects of its pro-
posed use and, upon its effecting the modifications, the state's use would be
permitted under the local zoning ordinance.' 7 If the conditions imposed by
the local zoning authority were reasonable and did not require the state to
modify its proposed use in ways that would severely compromise the state's
original objectives, the state would likely make the modifications to accom-
modate local concerns.
If a compromise resolution of a conflict between local zoning restrictions
and a proposed state activity is reached during the administrative process for
the issuance of a conditional use permit, the courts need not confront the
issue. Moreover, the resolution stipulated in the preceeding paragraph is a
true accommodation. Local zoning interests are served by the state's modifi-
cation of the proposed use, and the state's interests are served because the
modified use is permitted under the local zoning scheme. By contrast, a
judicial resolution of the conflict under the-eminent domain test is an all-or-
nothing proposition that completely serves one set of public interests at the
expense of disserving the other."8 For example, if the state's proposed use is
supported by the power of eminent domain, the courts will hold that use
immune from local zoning restrictions and the state is under no obligation to
accommodate the interests served by the zoning power." 9 By contrast, if the
state's proposed use is not supported by the power of eminent domain, the
courts will hold the use subject to local zoning restrictions and the local
zoning authority will have no incentive to accommodate the public interests
served by the state activity. 20 Either result represents an unjustified over-
broad application of the eminent domain test if administrative remedies that
could lead to accommodation of both sets of interests have not been ex-
hausted. The eminent domain test does not require the courts to insist upon
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Instead, the only inquiry is whether
the state's proposed activity is supported by the power of appropriation.
The apparently obvious solution to overbroad applications of the eminent
domain test is for the courts to refuse to resolve conflicts under the eminent
domain test prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. An exhaustion
of administrative remedies requirement is by no means foreign to the law of
zoning,"' and nothing prevents the courts from imposing an exhaustion re-
117. In Brownfield, the city might have issued a conditional use permit subject to the condition that the
number of residents in the halfway house not exceed five. See note 115 supra.
118. See State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345 (1952) (state
turnpike prevails over local zoning interests); City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Auth., 16 Ohio
Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (Licking County C.P. 1967) (county airport expansion prevails over local zoning
interests); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Cuyahoga County
C.P. 1947) (county airport operation prevails over local zoning interests).
119. See note 68 and text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
120. This is the clear implication of the eminent domain test, but Ohio courts have never confronted a case
in which there was a conflict between a state activity and local zoning restrictions and the activity was not
supported by the power of eminent domain. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see note 106 supra.
121. "It is a general rule that a party seeking relief under the zoning laws must first pursue and exhaust the
administrative remedy available to him before bringing an action or proceeding for judicial relief, unless the
administrative remedy is inadequate or nonexistent." 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 25.283 (3d ed. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
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quirement under the eminent domain test.'22 On the surface, the imposition of
an exhaustion requirement seems to accomplish the goal of eliminating over-
broad applications of the eminent domain test by forcing the parties to utilize
the administrative processes that may lead to an accommodation of state and
local interests. For example, under an exhaustion requirement the state would
be forced to apply for a conditional use permit if its activity that otherwise
violates local zoning restrictions might qualify as a conditional use. 123 A more
careful analysis of the eminent domain test reveals that, even with the imposi-
tion of a requirement for the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the test
would remain overbroad in application . 4 The courts would continue to apply
the test in circumstances in which an accommodation of state and local inter-
ests might otherwise be achieved because judicial outcomes under the
eminent domain test are highly predictable and one of the parties would have
a significant incentive to hold out for a judicial resolution of the conflict.
Judicial outcomes under the eminent domain test are highly predictable
because the test is applied mechanically and the essential judicial inquiry is
simple and clear cut. Under the test, the only inquiry for the courts is whether
the state activity is supported by the power of eminent domain. 12 If the state
activity is supported by the power of appropriation, the activity is immune
from local zoning restrictions;2 6 if the state activity is not supported by the
power of eminent domain, the activity is subject to local zoning restrictions.'2 7
In either case, the inquiry is not complicated and the judicial outcome can be
predicted with relative ease.28 Ordinarily, attributes of simplicity and predict-
ability are desirable characteristics for a judicial test because they give a clear
indication of what behavior the courts will find acceptable and unacceptable.
Unfortunately, the predictability of outcomes under the eminent domain test
acts as a disincentive to nonjudicial resolutions of conflicts through an
accommodation of state and local interests.
As a general rule, the state will prefer a judicial resolution of a conflict
under the eminent domain test when its proposed activity is supported by the
power of eminent domain. If the eminent domain power is present, the state
can be confident of a favorable judicial outcome and there is no incentive for
the state to accommodate the interests served by local zoning restrictions.'2 9
122. An exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement was imposed by the court in Brownfield as a
matter of judicial discretion. See text accompanying notes 228-50 infra.
123. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 228-34 infra.
124. Even if an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement could be effectively imposed under the
eminent domain test, the test should still be rejected because its distinction between the public interests served
by the zoning and eminent domain powers is unjustified. See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
125. But see note 68 and accompanying text supra.
126. See State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied sub
norn. Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport
Auth., 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (Licking County C.P. 1967); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1947).
127. See note 120 supra.
128. The courts may, of course, reject a test after applying it over a considerable period of time. See
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 284-85, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980) (rejecting Ohio's traditional
eminent domain test).
129. See authorities cited in note 118 supra.
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By contrast, the local zoning authority will prefer a judicial resolution under
the eminent domain test when the state's activity is not supported by the
power of eminent domain because, when the power is absent, the eminent
domain test requires the state to comply with local zoning restrictions. 30
Therefore, when the eminent domain power is not present to support the
state's activity, the local zoning authority will have no incentive to accom-
modate the interests served by the state's activity. In either case, one of the
parties to the conflict is not likely to engage in serious attempts toward
accommodation, even under an exhaustion of administrative remedies re-
quirement, because that party can be reasonably certain that its interests will
be fully vindicated by a judicial resolution of the conflict.'
The principle flaws in the eminent domain test are the absence of a clear
theoretical or historical justification for distinguishing between the powers of
zoning and eminent domain 3 2 and the inherent potential for overbroad ap-
plication of the test that circumvents accommodations of both state and local
interests. These flaws are sufficiently serious to justify an exploration of
alternative rules for resolving conflicts between local zoning restrictions and
state activities. One alternative rule was suggested by plaintiff-appellants in
Brownfield.
B. The Governmental-Proprietary Use Distinction
Plaintiff-appellants in Brownfield argued that the conflict between the
state's proposed halfway house and the local zoning ordinance should be
resolved on the basis of the governmental-proprietary use distinction.'3
"Under this test, uses of a governmental (essential) nature are immune from
local zoning ordinances, while uses of a proprietary (permissive) nature are
not.' 35 Plaintiff-appellants' position was that the proposed halfway house,
though an authorized state activity, was not an undertaking essential to the
general public welfare. 36 Consequently, the halfway house should not have
been immune from local zoning restrictions.
1. Nature of the Governmental-Proprietary Use Distinction
Though the Ohio courts have never subscribed to the governmental-
proprietary use distinction in the zoning context, 38 a number of jurisdictions
130. See note 120 supra.
131. See note 106 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 106-31 supra.
134. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
135. Id.
136. Brief of Appellants at 25-27, Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
137. Id.
138. The distinction has its origins in the doctrines of municipal tort liability and has been applied by the
Ohio courts, among others, in this context. See Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the
Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936). See generally 3 FARRELL, THE LAWV
GOVERNING MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN OHIO §§ 15.1-15.2 (1lth ed. 1962).
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rely on the distinction to resolve conflicts between local zoning restrictions
and state activities. 3 9 Two of the leading cases from other jurisdictions are
City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court'40 and Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd
Harbor.4' These cases clarify the nature of the governmental-proprietary use
distinction. The use of land is "governmental," as opposed to "proprietary,"
when the use is a response to matters of public necessity.'42 Public necessity,
in turn, incorporates two notions. First, the public in general, and not some
isolated fraction thereof, must benefit from the state activity. Second, the
activity must address a true need, not a matter of mere convenience.'
43
In City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court,44 the Supreme Court of
Arizona held Scottsdale's operation of a municipal sewage plant immune from
the city of Tempe's zoning ordinance under the governmental-proprietary use
distinction. Scottsdale sought to expand its existing sewage plant onto twenty
acres of land adjoining the existing site. 45 Neither the existing plant nor the
expansion site were located in Scottsdale. 46 Two years after Scottsdale's
purchase of the expansion site, Tempe annexed a section of land embracing
both the existing facility and the expansion site and zoned the area residen-
tial. 47 Scottsdale's application for a use permit was denied by Tempe, but
Scottsdale, believing itself immune from Tempe's zoning ordinance, com-
menced construction on the twenty acre site.'" Tempe cited Scottsdale in
municipal court for violating Tempe's zoning ordinance, and Scottsdale
brought an original action in the Supreme Court of Arizona to prohibit the
municipal court of Tempe from enforcing the zoning ordinance against
Scottsdale's construction.' 49 Tempe, relying on the governmental-proprietary
139. See Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State
Agencies, 49 MINN. L. REV. 284, 295 n.41 (1964).
140. 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962).
141. 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
142. See text accompanying notes 144-66 infra.
143. These components are apparent in the following general formulations of the governmental-proprietary
use distinction: "The unit performs a proprietary function if the act is permissive in nature, i.e., if the particular
political unit has the power, but not the duty, to perform a specific function." Note, Governmental Immunity
from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870 (1971) (footnotes omitted); "Governmental func-
tions are those required by legislative mandate and involving a direct benefit to the general public, while an
activity conferring private advantages pursuant to permissive legislation is proprietary." Note, Municipal
Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49 MINN. L. REV. 284,
295-96 (1964) (footnotes omitted);
The criteria used in determining whether an activity is governmental or proprietary are: (1) a municipal-
ity performs a governmental function when doing acts required by legislative mandate whereas it acts
in a proprietary capacity when performing by legislative permission, and, (2) a municipal function is
governmental when the acts involves [sic] benefit to the general public as distinguished from acts which
involve private benefits and in which public benefit is indirect.
Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316, 318 (1961)
(footnotes omitted).
144. 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962).
145. Id. at 395, 368 P.2d at 638.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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use distinction, argued that the sewage plant was a proprietary activity and
therefore should be subject to local zoning restrictions. 50
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Scottsdale is instruc-
tive in delineating the determinative characteristics of a "governmental" use.
In holding Scottsdale's use immune from Tempe's zoning ordinance, the
court accepted the governmental-proprietary use distinction but held that
operation of a sewage plant is a governmental function. The court began its
analysis by observing that prior cases classified garbage collection as a
governmental use.'5 ' This classification was grounded on the notion that "the
preservation of the public health is one of the duties that devolves upon the
state as a sovereignty. -152 The court then concluded that the operation of a
sewage plant is a governmental use because "sewage disposal is not merely
desirable, it is a stark necessity."' 53 Sewage disposal, like garbage collection,
was classified as a governmental use on the grounds that a matter of general
public necessity-the preservation of public health-was served by the activ-
ity.
Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor54 also relies on a public necessity
criterion to distinguish governmental and proprietary uses. In Nehrbas, the
defendant village purchased a two-acre parcel containing a large barn. The
village proposed to use the barn for public offices and as a garage for certain
village vehicles, including two garbage trucks.' 55 Plaintiffs, owners of a near-
by residential parcel, initiated an action to enjoin the village from using the
barn and land for nonresidential purposes. 6 The defendant's barn was locat-
ed in a district zoned for residential purposes only.
57
The Nehrbas court applied the governmental-proprietary use distinction
on the grounds that "a municipality must have the power to select the site of
buildings or other structures for the performance of its governmental duties.
Accordingly, it necessarily follows, a village is not subject to zoning restric-
tions in the performance of its governmental, as distinguished from its cor-
porate or proprietary, functions.' 58 Plaintiffs contended that use of the barn
as a garage for police cars, highway department trucks, and garbage trucks
was not a governmental use.159 In answering this contention, the court admit-
ted that the governmental-proprietary use distinction is not easily applied
because "no all embracing formula or definition is possible."'60 Nevertheless,
the court approved the garaging of police cars and highway equipment at the
150. Id. at 397-98, 368 P.2d at 639.
151. Id. at 398, 368 P.2d at 640.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
155. Id. at 192, 140 N.E.2d at 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
156. Id. at 192-93, 140 N.E.2d at 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47.
157. Id. at 193, 140 N.E.2d at 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 194, 140 N.E.2d at 243, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
160. Id.
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barn because the funishing of a police force and maintenance of roads and
highways are clearly governmental functions. 61 The garaging of garbage
trucks presented a more difficult question, but the court concluded garbage
removal was also a governmental function because "the continued well-being
and health of the community... demand that garbage be removed."' 62 In the
words of the court, "necessity creates the duty, and it is incumbent upon the
municipality to assure ... [the] collection and disposal" of garbage to pre-
serve the public health. 63
Scottsdale and Nehrbas highlight the central components of the public
necessity criteria used to distinguish governmental and proprietary uses164
The cases classify garbage collection and sewage disposal as governmental
uses because these two activities preserve the public health.' 65 Preservation
of the public health is a "duty" of government66-not a matter of mere
convenience-and the general public benefits from government's fulfillment
of this duty. Since garbage collection and sewage disposal meet these two
components of the public necessity criteria, the activities are classified as
governmental uses immune from local zoning restrictions. This result appears
justified in Scottsdale and Nehrbas, but a more thorough analysis of the
governmental-proprietary use distinction casts serious doubt upon its useful-
ness as a tool for resolving conflicts between local zoning restrictions and
state activities.
2. Critical Analysis of the Governmental-Proprietary Use Distinction
Brownfield rejects the governmental-proprietary use distinction for
reasons that are not completely clear. After citing a case and several com-
mentaries criticizing the distinction,67 the court concluded, "Because of its
difficulty of application and tenuous nexus with the realities of governmental
activity, we believe that the governmental-proprietary distinction serves no
useful purpose in the field of municipal zoning."' 66 The crux of this criticism
appears to be that the criteria for applying the distinction are vague 69 and an
inappropriate basis for determining whether state activities are immune from
local zoning restrictions.7
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 194-95, 140 N.E.2d at 243, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
164. See note 143 supra and text accompanying.
165. See text accompanying notes 152-53 and 163 supra.
166. Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 194, 140 N.E.2d 241, 243, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148
(1957).
167. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980) (citing Township of
Worthington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584, 141 A.2d 308, 311 (1958); Seasongood, Municipal
Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936); Note, Govern-
mental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1971); Comment, The Applicability of
Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316 (1961); Recent Decisions, 15 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 499 (1937)).
168. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
169. See text accompanying notes 171-76 infra.
170. See text accompanying notes 183-86 infra.
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The principle criticism of the governmental-proprietary use distinction is
that "its vagueness makes it virtually impossible to apply.'' One noted
commentator has denounced the test because "no satisfactory basis for solv-
ing the problem whether the activity falls into one class or other has been
evolved."' 72 This vagueness is illustrated by the classifying criteria used in
Scottsdale and Nehrbas. Under these cases, a use is governmental if there is,
in the judgment of the court, sufficient "public necessity" supporting the
use.73 What is a necessity in the view of one court may not, however, be a
necessity in the view of another.
Even when the components of the public necessity criteria are isolated,
the criteria remains vague and application of the governmental-proprietary
use distinction leads to unpredictable and confusing results.'74 Application of
the governmental-proprietary use distinction has resulted in different clas-
sifications of the same use by various jurisdictions and, in some instances,
different classifications of the same or very similar uses within a single juris-
diction.' 75 Even when the classification of a use appears firmly established in
a given jurisdiction, the classification may change over time.76 As a general
matter, the lack of even marginally predictable results caused by the vague-
ness of the public necessity criteria puts both the state and local zoning
authorities in an extremely difficult position. In a regime of uncertainty,
policymakers are left to formulate policy on the basis of unsatisfactory
guesses, not reasoned judgments.
The governmental-proprietary use distinction suffers from infirmities
other than its reliance on vague criteria. In particular, the distinction's rule of
immunity is unjustifiably overbroad in substance and application, and zoning
interests are not considered in judicial resolutions of the immunity question.
Under the governmental-proprietary use distinction, immunity from local
zoning restrictions for governmental uses is premised on the view that the
state "must have the power to select the site of buildings or other structures
for the performance of its governmental duties."' 77 Governmental uses of
land support the performance of governmental duties, and the rule of immun-
ity for such uses is premised on the assumption that duties cannot be perform-
ed effectively if governmental uses are encumbered by local zoning restric-
tions. However, local zoning restrictions do not always conflict with the
171. Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49
MINN. L. REV. 284, 296 (1964).
172. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Government or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L.
REV. 910, 938 (1936).
173. See text accompanying notes 138-66 supra.
174. Moreover, these results are unjustified because the narrow focus of the public necessity criterion is
not supported by principle. See text accompanying notes 183-86 infra. Compare text accompanying notes
294-304 infra, offering justification for the vagueness of the balancing test.
175. Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316,
319 (1964).
176. Id.
177. Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 193, 140 N.E.2d 241, 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147
(1957).
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effective performance of governmental duties, and when no conflict exists
there is no justification for a rule extending immunity to all governmental
uses. The rule is overbroad in substance when compliance with local zoning
restrictions does not compromise the effective performance of governmental
functions.
Compliance with local zoning restrictions does not compromise the
state's ability to perform governmental functions when several sites are avail-
able for a governmental use and each site enables the state to perform its
duties effectively. If the sites are equally well-suited to the governmental use
or differences between the sites are marginal, it is of little or no consequence
to the state if local zoning restrictions prohibit the governmental use on one or
several of the sites. The remaining sites serve the state's interests equally
well, and, under these circumstances, the necessity for undertaking a govern-
mental use does not justify immunity from local zoning restrictions.
The governmental-proprietary use distinction is not only overbroad in
substance; it is also overbroad in application. In this respect, the deficiency of
the governmental-proprietary use distinction mirrors a deficiency in the
eminent domain test.t78 As with the eminent domain test, there is no require-
ment under the governmental-proprietary use distinction that administrative
remedies be exhausted before the courts will resolve a conflict between local
zoning restrictions and a state activity. 79 Administrative processes in the
zoning law facilitate negotiation and compromise and include mechanisms for
accommodation of both state and local interests.'8° Judicial resolution of a
conflict under the governmental-proprietary use distinction stands in stark
contrast to accommodations that may be achieved by an administrative res-
olution. The ultimate judicial resolution of a conflict is an all-or-nothing
proposition. If the state's proposed use is classified as governmental, the use
is immune from local zoning restrictions and the interests served by the
zoning power are completely disserved; if the state's proposed use is clas-
sified as proprietary, the use is subject to local zoning restrictions and the
state's interests are disserved.'8' Neither result can be justified if the possibil-
ity of an accommodation serving both state and local interests is ignored by
the courts. In applying the governmental-proprietary use distinction, the
courts ignore this possibility by their failure to insist that administrative
processes for resolution of the conflict be exhausted prior to a judicial resolu-
tion of the disputein
The final, and perhaps most fundamental, infirmity of the governmental-
proprietary use distinction is its narrow focus on the public interests served
178. See text accompanying notes 106-20 supra.
179. The cases simply do not impose such a requirement. See, e.g., City ofScottsdale v. Municipal Court,
90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962); Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159
N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
180. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
181. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 907 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
182. See note 179 supra and accompanying text.
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by state activities. Under the governmental-proprietary use distinction, the
intensity of the public interests served by a state activity is the only factor
upon which the courts rely to resolve a conflict between the state's activity
and local zoning restrictions.8 3 If the intensity of the interests served by the
state's activity rises to the level of public necessity, the activity is classified as
a governmental use immune from local zoning restrictions.'M If the interests
served by the activity do not qualify as a matter of public necessity, the
activity is classified as a proprietary use subject to local zoning restrictions."
Zoning interests play no role in the distinction between governmental and
proprietary uses.
In ignoring zoning interests and focusing exclusively on the interests
served by state activities, the governmental-proprietary use distinction draws
an implicit distinction between two sets of public interests. In the determina-
tion of immunity from local zoning restrictions, the public interests served by
the zoning power are subordinated to the public interests served by state
activities. Intuitively, this is an unacceptable position. If the intensity of the
public interests served by a state activity is relevant to the determination of
immunity, the intensity of all public interests implicated in a conflict between
the state activity and local zoning restrictions should be considered by the
courts. By foreclosing consideration of zoning interests, the governmental-
proprietary use distinction runs contrary to this intuitive notion. Moreover,
the test offers no principled basis for distinguishing the public interests served
by zoning from the public interests served by other state activities. The earlier
analysis of the eminent domain test suggests there is no principled basis for
distinguishing and subordinating zoning interests to other public interests of
the state.186 State interests and the interests served by local zoning restric-
tions are both grounded in the concept of the public welfare, which is best
served by a decision-making process that weighs all public interests.
The absence of a justification for excluding zoning interests from con-
sideration in the judicial decision to grant immunity to a state activity,
coupled with problems of overbreadth and vagueness, support Brownfield's
rejection of the governmental-proprietary use distinction as a means for re-
solving conflicts between state activities and local zoning restrictions.
Brownfield's balancing test rectifies these infirmities of the governmental-
proprietary use distinction and similar flaws in the eminent domain test.
183. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962); Nehrbas v. Village
of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957); Note, Governmental Immunityfrom
Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870-71 (1971).
184. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
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Ill. NATURE OF THE BROWNFIELD BALANCING TEST
Under the test adopted in Brownfield, conflicts between state activities
and local zoning restrictions are resolved by weighing the public interests
served by the proposed state activity against the public interests served by the
enforcement of local zoning restrictions.' 7 This balancing of government
interests rests on the principle that
the correct approach in these cases where conflicting interests of governmental
entities appear would be in each instance to weigh the general public purposes to
be served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in favor of
that power which will serve the needs of the greater number of our citizens.18
This statement of principle indicates dissatisfaction with the eminent domain
test and the governmental-proprietary use distinction, both of which fail to
account for the public interests served by zoning.
A. Interests Considered in Judicial Balancing
The court in Brownfield set forth the following factors as relevant in the
balancing approach:
Where compliance with zoning regulation would frustrate or significantly hinder
the public purpose underlying the acquisition of property, a court should consider,
inter alia, the essential nature of the government-owned facility, the impact of the
facility upon surrounding property, and the alternative locations available for the
facility, in determining whether the proposed use should be immune from zoninglaws. s
The court drew these factors from Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester,'"9 a
Minnesota decision applying a balancing test.
In Oronoco, the city of Rochester undertook efforts to replace its existing
waste disposal facilities with a sanitary landfill. Site selection was begun in
1968, and after consultation with the state pollution control agency, Rochester
obtained an option to purchase a 252 acre farm. The farm was located north of
the city in the township of Oronoco. The option to purchase was obtained
with an intent on the part of the city to conduct tests to determine whether the
site would be suitable for use as a landfill."9 ' Oronoco sought to enjoin the
undertaking because under the Oronoco zoning ordinance and a county
zoning ordinance the land was zoned for agricultural use."
187. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
188. Id. Fortunately, the court lends substance to this principle by specifying the considerations relevant to
the balancing decision. See text accompanying notes 189-214 infra. Without the specification of these considera-
tions, the court's language rings of political decision making and vote counting.
189. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286-87, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
190. 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
191. Id. at 468-69, 197 N.W.2d at 427.
192. Id. at 469, 197 N.W.2d at 427.
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Pursuant to Oronoco's action, the trial court granted a temporary injunc-
tion that required the city of Rochester to notify the court prior to the begin-
ning of construction.'93 The Rochester City Council appointed a technical
committee to select sites for the proposed landfill. The committee recom-
mended five locations to the mayor, including the Oronoco site. The mayor
appointed a second site selection committee, which reported a list of eight
possible sites in order of preference. The Oronoco site was ranked second,
but the location ranked first subsequently became unavailable due to pollution
control difficulties. 94
In February 1970 the state pollution control agency issued a permit for
the construction and operation of a sanitary landfill at the Oronoco site.
Under the permit, the pollution control agency's approval for construction
and operation of the landfill was subject to several conditions designed to
ensure proper pollution control at the landfill.'95 In March 1970 Rochester
applied for a special exception permit from the County Planning Advisory
,Commission to bperate its landfill at the Oronoco site. The application for the
special exception permit was submitted under the provisions of a recent
amendment to the county zoning ordinance. The amendment authorized the
County Planning Advisory Commission to issue special exception permits for
the operation of landfills in areas where the zoning ordinance would otherwise
prohibit landfills. The permit was refused, and the County Board of Adjust-
ment affirmed the refusal.' 96 Rochester's appeal was consolidated with the
earlier action brought by Oronoco to enjoin construction, and landowners in
the area were permitted to intervene. The trial court, after a hearing, denied
injunctive relief and ordered the County Planning Advisory Commission to
issue a special exception permit.' 97 The county and individual intervenors
appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
The supreme court treated the case as raising two distinct issues of
governmental immunity from local zoning restrictions. The issues were
whether the Oronoco township zoning ordinance was applicable to
Rochester's landfill and whether the county zoning ordinance was applicable
to the landfill.' 98 The township ordinance was held inapplicable to Rochester's
landfill under the eminent domain test. 9' By contrast, with respect to the
issue of the applicability of the county zoning ordinance, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision after resorting to a test that balanced two factors.20°
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 469-70, 197 N.W.2d at 427-28.
196. Id. at 470, 197 N.W.2d at 428.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. The Oronoco court gave no satisfactory explanation for its selective use of the eminent domain test
against only the township zoning ordinance. By contrast, Brownfield's balancing test appears applicable regard-
less of the governmental unit imposing the zoning restrictions or proposing the land use. Board of Educ. v.
Puck, No. 999,280, slip op. at 5 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980).
200. 293 Minn. 468, 471-72, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (1972).
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First, the court examined the need for the new landfill, noting that the present
landfill site utilized by the city had insufficient cover material and constituted
a pollution threat to a nearby river.20' Balanced against this consideration
were the various environmental threats presented by use of the Oronoco site.
With respect to these threats, the court was satisfied that the approval of the
state pollution control agency, together with the duty of the agency to regulate
the future operation of the landfill, was adequate to prevent any environ-
mental hazards that site development would create.202
The rationale and holding of Oronoco clarify the meaning of the
Brownfield court's language regarding two of the factors involved in the
Brownfield balancing test. The "essential nature of the government-owned
facility" 20 3 refers to the need for the facility, not to its intrinsic character. In
Oronoco, the development of the new landfill site allowed Rochester to termi-
nate use of an existing landfill that created environmental hazards.20' The
character of the government activity is to be considered in the evaluation of
the "impact of the facility upon surrounding property., 20 5 In Oronoco, that
impact was claimed to be environmental hazards. The fact that the Oronoco
court found state regulation sufficient to mitigate that impact °6 suggests the
impact must be assessed realistically in light of relevant mitigating circum-
stances and external controls.
While the rationale and holding of Oronoco clarify the content and mean-
ing of the first two balancing factors identified in Brownfield, Oronoco
provides less guidance regarding the content of the third balancing element
identified by the Brownfield court-alternative locations for the proposed use.
Given the facts of Oronoco, Brownfield's requirement that "a court should
consider ... the alternative locations available for the facility ' 20 7 could have
one of two meanings. First, this language could mean a court should explore
whether alternative sites are available that effectively serve the proposed use
and minimize any disservice of the interests underlying local zoning restric-
tions. A second interpretation is that Brownfield requires only that the court
be convinced that the state has conducted a good faith evaluation of alter-
native sites before concluding that the proposed site is the location best suited
to the state's needs. The second interpretation is supported by Oronoco's
lengthy discussion of the site selection efforts undertaken by Rochester 2's but
makes little sense in light of Brownfield's independent requirement "that the
condemning or land-owning authority must make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the zoning restrictions of the affected political subdivision" prior
201. Id. at 472, 197 N.W.2d at 429.
202. Id.
203. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.W.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
204. 293 Minn. 468, 472, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
205. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
206. 293 Minn. 468, 472, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
207. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286-87, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
208. 293 Minn. 468, 468-70, 197 N.W.2d 426, 427-28 (1972).
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to a judicial resolution of the conflict under the balancing test.2 9 Moreover, a
careful reading of the language in Brownfield outlining the factors considered
in balancing indicates that the "court," not the "state," "should con-
sider ... the alternative locations available for the facility." 210 This choice of
language belies any suggestion that the balancing inquiry is whether the state
undertook a good faith evaluation of alternative sites and confirms the in-
terpretation requiring the court to conduct a de novo exploration of siting
alternatives. The extent of this de novo review of alternative sites is an open
question. In Oronoco, plaintiffs alleged only that "a different site should be
selected" but failed to specify what alternative sites were available for
Rochester's landfill.2 1' The only concrete alternative before the court was the
present landfill site that was unsuitable for continued use due to environ-
mental hazards. 2
Presumably, the scope of a court's review of alternative sites under the
balancing test will be determined by the evidence plaintiff presents. If the
evidence put forward by plaintiff establishes that appropriate alternative sites
are available for the state's proposed activity, the state should have the
burden of demonstrating the site it selected is preferable.2 3 Absent some
specific suggestions of alternative sites by plaintiff, it would be unreasonable
to require the state to prove that the site it selected is preferable to all other
siting possibilities. In theory, the number of available alternative sites may be
virtually unlimited, or at least so large as to make trying the case unmanage-
able or the state's burden impossible to meet. Placing the burden of going
forward on the plaintiff is not unreasonable, because before a case is con-
sidered by the courts under the balancing test, the state must demonstrate that
it made a good faith effort to evaluate alternative sites.2 4 Presumably, the
content of the state's effort will be a matter of public record, and the alter-
native sites examined by the state are likely to be among the alternatives
plaintiff will put forward for evaluation by the court. If plaintiff can credibly
demonstrate that additional sites appropriate for the proposed use were not
evaluated by the state, the court should refuse to decide the conflict under the
balancing test because the state has failed to meet its good faith obligation.
The state's obligation to conduct a good faith evaluation of alternative sites
and make reasonable efforts to comply with local zoning restrictions is one of
two threshold requirements that must be met before the courts will resolve the
conflict under the balancing test.
209. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
210. Id. at 286-87, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
211. 293 Minn. 468, 472, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
212. Id.
213. The state should have the evidence on hand to meet this burden because Brownfield requires the state
to undertake a good faith evaluation of alternative sites. Id.; see text accompanying notes 251-72 infra.
214. If plaintiffs have no burden ofgoing forward and the burden of proof rests on the state, the state will be
placed in the impossible position of proving a negative on an undefined issue. Plaintiff's burden of going forward
with some evidence of alternative sites defines the issue by narrowing the area of factual controversy to those
sites put forward by plaintiff.
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B. Limitations on Judicial Resolution of Conflicts under the Balancing Test
Though Brownfield adopts a balancing test, it also strictly limits resort to
the test by setting up two threshold requirements that must be met prior to the
judicial balancing inquiry. First, "direct statutory grant[s] of immunity" will
control when they exist.215 Second, when statutory grants of immunity are not
present, the court will not resolve conflicts under the balancing test unless the
state has made a reasonable good faith attempt to comply with local zoning
211restrictions.
Brownfield's deference to direct statutory grants of immunity substan-
tially limits, but does not eliminate entirely, resort to judicial resolution of
conflicts between state activities and local zoning restrictions. Statutory
grants of immunity from local zoning restrictions, while seemingly broad on
their face, are surprisingly limited on analysis.
The principle statutory provision granting to government agencies immu-
nity from local zoning restrictions is section 713.02 of the Ohio Revised
Code.2 This section confers upon city planning commissions the power to
215. The controlling nature of statutory grants of immunity is indicated by the following language of the
court: "Thus, unless there exists a direct statutory grant of immunity in a given instance, the condemning or
land-owning authority must make a reasonable attempt to comply with the zoning restrictions of the affected
political subdivision." 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980) (emphasis added).
216. See text accompanying notes 251-72 infra.
217. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.02 (Page 1979). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The planning commission established under section 713.01 of the Revised Code shall make plans
and maps of the whole or any portion of the municipal corporation, and of any land outside thereof,
which, in the opinion of the commission, is related to the planning of the municipal corporation, and
make changes in such plans or maps when it deems it advisable. Such maps or plans shall show the
commission's recommendations for the general location, character, and extent of streets, alleys, ways,
viaducts. bridges, waterways, waterfronts, subways, boulevards, parkways, parks, playgrounds, avia
tion fields and other public grounds, ways, and open spaces; the general location of public buildings and
other public property; the general location and extent of public utilities and terminals, whether publicly
or privately owned or operated, for water, light, sanitation, transportation, communication, power,
and other purposes; and the removal, relocation, widening, narrowing, vacating, abandonment, change
of use or extension of such public ways, grounds, open spaces, buildings, property, utilities, or
terminals. With a view to the systematic planning of the municipal corporation, the commission may
make recommendations to public officials concerning the general location, character, and extent of any
such public ways, grounds, open spaces, buildings, property, utilities, or terminals .... This section
does not confer any powers on the commission with respect to the construction, maintenance, use, or
enlargement of improvements by any public utility or railroad on its own property if such utility is
owned or operated by an individual, partnership, association, or a corporation for profit.
Whenever the commission makes a plan of the municipal corporation, or any portion thereof, no
public building or structure, street, boulevard, parkway, park, playground, public ground, canal, river
front, harbor, dock, wharf, bridge, viaduct, tunnel, or other public way, ground, works, or utility,
whether publicly or privately owned, or a part thereof, shall be constructed or authorized to be
constructed in the municipal corporation or planned portion thereof unless the location, character, and
extent thereof is approved by the commission. In case of disapproval the commission shall commu-
nicate its reasons therefor to the legislative authority of the municipal corporation and to the head of
the department which has control of the construction of the proposed improvement or utility. The
legislative authority, by a vote of not less than two-thirds of its members and of such department head,
together may overrule such disapproval. If such public way, ground, works, building, structure, or
utility is one the authorization or financing of which does not, under the law or charter provisions
governing it, fall within the province of a municipal legislative authority or other municipal body or
official, the submission to the commission shall be by the state, school, county, district, or township
official, board, commission, or body by a vote of not less than two-thirds of its membership. The
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establish comprehensive zoning schemes and contains specific provisions
detailing the authority that planning commissions have over public improve-
ments undertaken by the state, its authorized agents, and local subdivisions.
Under this section, the planning commission must, in its comprehensive plan,
make recommendations for (1) the general location, character, and extent of
public ways, aviation fields, and other public grounds, (2) the general location
of public buildings and other public property, and (3) the general location and
extent of utilities, whether publicly or privately owned.1 8 In spite of these
requirements, the section removes privately owned and operated utilities
from the binding authority of the planning commission2 19 and establishes a
mechanism for withdrawing the public improvements of government from the
authority of the commission.
The statutory immunity provisions for government public improvements
are procedural. The statute first provides that the planning commission shall
have authority to approve the construction or proposed construction of public
buildings, ways, and utilities in areas subject to the commission's plan. 220 In
case of disapproval, the commission must communicate its reasons to the
appropriate officials of the state or local government unit or agency author-
izing the improvement in the first instance. 2 These officials may, by a mini-
mum two-thirds vote, overrule the disapproval of the planning commission
and proceed with construction. 222 Significantly, the planning commission's
approval is required, and the appropriate agency may overrule its disapprov-
al, only when the project involves the construction of public improvements.'
By its terms, the statute has no application to land acquisitions and uses that
do not require construction. When the commission is not vested with the
authority to approve or disapprove public construction projects, it may none-
theless make recommendations regarding appropriate locations for public
structures.' This ensures some consideration of local zoning interests de-
spite the absence of any authority to compel compliance with local zoning
restrictions.
The second limitation on resort to the balancing test applies only when
there is no direct legislative grant of immunity.m Brownfield requires that
under such circumstances "the condemning or land-owning authority must
narrowing, ornamentation, vacation, or change in the use of streets or other public ways, grounds, and
places shall be subject to similar approval, and disapproval may be similarly overruled. The commis-
sion may make recommendations to any public authorities or to any corporations or individuals in such
municipal corporation or the territory contiguous thereto, concerning the location of any buildings,
structures, or works to be erected or constructed by them.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. A direct grant of immunity is controlling and will end a court's inquiry under the balancing test. See
note 215 supra.
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make a reasonable attempt to comply with the zoning restrictions of the
affected political subdivision." '6 The clear implication of this language, as
indicated by the disposition in Brownfield, is that the courts will not resort to
the balancing test until they are satisfied that the state has undertaken such
compliance efforts. Brownfield was not decided on the balancing test. Rather,
the court remanded the case because "the state of Ohio made no effort to
comply with the Akron zoning ordinance, nor does it appear that it considered
the impact of the proposed halfway house on the surrounding neighbor-
hood." 227 This language, together with other cases, indicates there are two
components to the requirement that the state make a reasonable attempt to
comply with local zoning restrictions.
First, Brownfield strongly and appropriately implies that a "reasonable
attempt to comply with local zoning restrictions" 2 includes the exhaustion
of administrative remedies available to the state under the local zoning
scheme. This requirement was later made explicit in Board of Education v.
Puck. '
In its recitation of facts the Brownfield court noted, "Neither the state
nor its lessee sought zoning approval from the city of Akron for the proposed
use of the premises. ' ' 30 And later, in the body of its opinion, the court
strongly hinted at one administrative mechanism available to the state in
Brownfield: "In the case sub judice, the city of Akron zoning ordinance
permits, as a conditional use, a '[Il]odging-house or hostel conducted for re-
habilitation.' It was possible, therefore, for the state of Ohio to both purchase
property for use as a halfway house and comply with the land use scheme of
the city of Akron." 2 3' In other words, the city of Akron zoning ordinance
permitted the operation of a halfway house as a conditional use in an area
zoned single-family residential. The use is subject to the state's application for
a conditional use permit from the local zoning authority and the authority's
issuance of the permit. The theory underlying conditional uses is that activi-
ties so designated might be compatible with the general scheme of zoning for
an area, but the city reserves the right to make that judgment on a case by
case basis. 2 If a particular proposed activity, such as the halfway house in
Brownfield, is incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood, the city may
issue a permit subject to certain modifications in the state's proposed use that
make the use fully compatible with the surrounding area. 3 Thus, two pos-
sible administrative resolutions of the conflict were open to the state in
Brownfield. The city might have granted the state a conditional use permit had
226. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
227. Id. at 287, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
228. Id. at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
229. No. 999,280 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980). See text accompanying notes 235-50
infra.
230. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (1980).
231. Id. at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
232. See note 110 supra.
233. See 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.160 (3d ed. 1976).
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the state made application, or the city might have issued a permit effective
only if the state modified its proposed use.24
In addition to requiring the state to apply for a conditional use permit,
Brownfield has also been interpreted to require the state to seek a variance for
its activity. In Board of Education v. Puck,23 5 the Eighth District Court of
Appeals expanded on Brownfield's requirement that administrative remedies
must be exhausted before there is judicial consideration of the immunity
issue. In Puck, the plaintiff-appellee Board of Education for the City of
Cleveland proposed to use an abandoned school site for storage of "buses
involved in the federal court-ordered desegregation plan.- 236 The site was
zoned, in part, "for general retail use," ' 23 7 with the balance "zoned as a
two-family district.''238 The Board of Education "applied to the
[city] ... for a [zoning] permit to use the abandoned school site as a storage
yard for school buses," 239 and when the permit was denied, the Board of
Education applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance. 240 The
Zoning Board "refused to grant a variance,",2 4' and the Board of Education
appealed to the trial court, which "ordered a permit to be issued." 242 The city
then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District.
In Puck, the court of appeals directly addressed Brownfield's require-
ment that the state make "a reasonable attempt to comply with local zoning
restrictions ' 1 3 prior to judicial consideration of the immunity issue:
The immunity issue arises only after efforts at compliance with municipal
zoning have failed. In this case the school board applied for a permit for the
desired use and, when that failed, sought a variance. It then appealed to Common
Pleas Court. These attempts, if not efforts at compliance, demonstrate at least a
respectful consideration of Cleveland zoning concerns and satisfy the prerequisite
of a failed compliance effort before reaching the immunity issue!
44
The Puck court was satisfied that application for a use permit, coupled with a
subsequent application for a variance and appeal to the courts, "satisf[ied] the
prerequisite of a failed compliance effort." 24' The immunity issue was there-
fore ripe for direct adjudication. Unfortunately, this issue was not decided by
the court. "[The record [was] barren on" the determinants of immunity set
forth in Brownfield 246 because it "was made before the [Brownfield] rule was
234. See notes 115 and 117 supra.
235. No. 999,280 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980).
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
244. No. 999,280 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980), slip op. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
245. Id. It remains open to question whether application for a variance should be required. See note 110
supra.
246. No. 999,280 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. App. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980), slip op. at 6.
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announced and both the Board of Zoning Appeals and Common Pleas Court
came to [their] conclusions on the basis of a record and legal rulings made in
response to a different rule." 247 The case was reversed and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings according to law.
248
Puck clearly indicates that Brownfield's "reasonable attempt[s] to
comply with local zoning restrictions" 249 includes the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies. Moreover, it appears from the language of the opinion2o
that exhaustion of administrative remedies in the form of use permits and
variances is the sole requirement of Brownfield's "reasonable attempts" rule.
This unduly restrictive view of the rule is subject to challenge based on the
language of Brownfield and cases cited therein.
In remanding Brownfield for further consideration, the supreme court
commented that "the state of Ohio made no effort to comply with the Akron
zoning ordinance, nor does it appear [the state] considered the impact of the
proposed halfway house upon the surrounding neighborhood."'1 The
emphasized language, together with an analysis of cases cited in the opinion,
strongly suggests that there is a second component to the reasonable attempts
requirement. The state must attempt to locate its facilities in a manner least
detrimental to the local zoning scheme. This component, which was ignored
by the court of appeals in Puck, requires the state to consider the impact of its
proposed facility on the surrounding neighborhood and undertake a good faith
evaluation of alternative sites for the facility. At the very least, the state may
not act arbitrarily. If the state fails to take those steps, the reasonable at-
tempts requirement has not been met and the immunity issue is not ripe for
judicial determination.
Brownfield's reliancen2 on Long Branch Division v. Cowan 3 and
Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood2 confirms the existence of
the second component of the "reasonable attempts" rule. In Long Branch the
New Jersey Department of Health attempted to establish a residential drug
rehabilitation center in the city of Long Branch. The center, formerly a
parochial school, was located in an area zoned for residential use. The domi-
nant land use in the area was one- and two-family homes.~5 The state pur-
chased the school building and began renovation without applying for a use
variance 6 or site plan approvalf from the city, the board of adjustment, or
247. Id.
248. Id. at 7.
249. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
250. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
251. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980) (emphasis added).
252. See id. (citing Township of Washington v. village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958);
Long Branch Div. v. Cowan, 119 N.J. Super. 306, 291 A.2d 381 (1972)).
253. 119 N.J. Super. 306, 291 A.2d 381 (1972).
254. 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958).
255. Long Branch Div. v. Cowan, 119 N.J. Super. 306, 308, 291 A.2d 381, 382 (1972).
256. See note 110 supra.
257. This term was not defined by the court.
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the planning commission. 58 The center was intended to serve addicts from
throughout the state.259 Plaintiff-appellants sought an injunction against the
establishment of the center. z ° The trial court granted the state's motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint, holding that the state was immune from local
zoning restrictions.26'
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, af-
firmed the trial court's immunity holding, but remanded the case to the lower
court for further proceedings. 262 Though the appellate court agreed that im-
munity was properly granted, it found that the immunity was not "completely
unbridled." 263 The state must act "in a reasonable fashion so as not to arbi-
trarily override all important legitimate local interest. '264 The remand was
accompanied by an order that the trial court conduct further hearings on the
issue of whether the state acted "unreasonably or arbitrarily" in the selection
of the site.2 65 The nature of this requirement is made clear in a second New
Jersey case cited in Brownfield, Township of Washington v. Village of
Ridgewood.266 Washington indicates that the reasonable efforts requirement
extends beyond a mere "arbitrariness" rule.
In Washington, the village of Ridgewood, in need of additional water
storage capacity, selected a site for the construction of an elevated water
tower. The site was on a tract of land located partially in Ridgewood and
partially in the township of Washington. The area was zoned for residential
use. 67 Washington Township and certain property owners therein brought
suit to enjoin further construction after the water tower was approximately
three-fourths complete.268 The trial court held for plaintiffs and ordered the
tower dismantled.269
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held the Washington
Township zoning ordinance inapplicable to Ridgewood, but affirmed the trial
court on the ground that Ridgewood's actions were unreasonable in light of
the facts. The court emphasized that reasonable alternatives were available
and that these alternatives would better accommodate local zoning inter-
ests.27 The alternatives included building a ground level rather than an el-
evated storage tank, or locating the tank at another site. Significantly, either
258. Long Branch Div. v. Cowan, 119 N.J. Super. 306, 308, 291 A.2d 381, 382 (1972).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 310, 291 A.2d at 383.
263. Id. at 309, 291 A.2d at 383.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 310, 291 A.2d at 383. Under the Superior Court's order, plaintiffs were to bear the burden of
proving the state acted unreasonably or arbitrarily. Id.
266. 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958).
267. Id. at 580, 141 A.2d at 309.
268. Id. at 582, 141 A.2d at 310.
269. Id. at 580, 141 A.2d at 309.
270. Id. at 582, 584-86, 141 A.2d at 310, 311-12.
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alternative would have increased Ridgewood's costs by more than twenty
percent.27'
Brownfield's reliance on Long Branch and Washington indicates that,
before a court will consider a claim that an activity is immune from local
zoning restrictions, the state must have made a reasonable attempt to accom-
modate the local zoning scheme by exploring alternative sites for its activity,
and if none are appropriate, by modifying the nature of its activity to accom-
modate surrounding uses at the proposed site. Alternative sites and modifica-
tions must be considered even if they substantially increase the cost of the
state's activity.27 2
At a minimum, Brownfid requires the exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the state's good faith consideration of alternatives prior to a
judicial resolution of the conflict under the balancing test. The wisdom of
these requirements, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the balancing
test when it is finally applied by the courts, remains to be evaluated.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCING TEST
The balancing of governmental interests test formulated in Brownfield
successfully avoids most of the conceptual and practical problems of the
eminent domain test and the governmental-proprietary use distinction. This is
not to suggest, however, that the balancing test satisfactorily resolves all of
the deficiencies of the alternative approaches for resolving conflicts between
local zoning restrictions and state activities.
The principle conceptual advantage of the balancing test is its recognition
that valid and legitimate public interests underlie the adoption and enforce-
ment of local zoning restrictions. Brownfield requires that these interests be
accounted for when conflicts between local zoning restrictions and state
activities are addressed by the courts. The state must consider the impact of
its proposed activities on surrounding neighborhoods when selecting sites for
those activities,273 and in applying the balancing test, the courts will evaluate
alternative sites for the state's activities and consider the impact of those
activities on surrounding property.274
By explicitly taking account of the interests served by local zoning re-
strictions, the balancing test recognizes and avoids the intractible problem
faced by proponents of both the eminent domain test and the governmental-
proprietary use distinction. These alternative approaches subordinate local
zoning interests to the interests served by state activities, but they provide no
justification for such an arbitrary choice. The eminent domain test rests on the
assumption that the interests underlying local zoning restrictions are uniform-
271. Id. at 584-86, 141 A.2d at 311-12.
272. Id.
273. See text accompanying notes 251-72 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 207-14 supra.
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ly subordinate to the interests underlying the power of eminent domain.275
The governmental-proprietary use distinction effects a more subtle subordi-
nation of zoning interests to the interests of the state by casting the state
interests in the role of the sole determinative criteria for judicial resolution of
immunity issues.276 Proponents of either approach must therefore offer some
principled basis for distinguishing the public interests served by zoning from
the public interests served by the power of eminent domain or various state
activities, and ultimately, the proponents must justify the subordination of
zoning interests to state interests. The cases utilizing these approaches do not
offer a principled basis for distinguishing and subordinating zoning interests,
and this is their primary deficiency.2'
If zoning interests are indistinguishable in principle from the interests
served by state activities, it follows that zoning interests are neither superior
nor inferior to the state's interests in undertaking land use activities. The
eminent domain test and the governmental-proprietary use distinction place
zoning interests in an inferior position. It is worth inquiring whether the
balancing test does more than restore these interests to a position of equival-
ence. The balancing test appears to place substantial procedural burdens on
the state and, in doing so, may effectively elevate zoning interests above the
interests served by state activities.
Brownfield requires the state to undertake reasonable efforts to comply
with local zoning restrictions.78 Moreover, though it is not perfectly clear
from the decision, the burden of justifying immunity appears to rest on the
state, and state activities are presumed to be subject to local zoning restric-
tions until this burden is met.279 Together, these requirements may place so
many hurdles in the state's path that the state will elect not to pursue certain
activities, or will undertake activities at less than optimal locations, rather
than undertake reasonable efforts to comply with local zoning restrictions and
bear the burden of proof in court.280
Several considerations mitigate the concern that Brownfield effectively
places local zoning interests in a position superior to the interests of the state.
First, while the costs of making a reasonable attempt to comply with local
zoning restrictions and pursuing a judicial resolution of a conflict may be more
275. See text accompanying notes 89-104 supra.
276. See text accompanying notes 183-86 supra.
277. See text accompanying notes 64-67, 89-105, and 183-86 supra.
278. See text accompanying notes 226-72 supra.
279. The court in Brownfield framed the issue as follows: "The central issue raised by this appeal is
whether a privately-operated, state-owned facility is automatically exempt from municipal zoning restrictions."
63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 284, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980) (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the court lists
factors that should be considered "in determining whether the proposed use should be immune from zoning
laws." Id. at 287, 407 N.E.2d at 1368 (emphasis added). No longer is the use "automatically exempt" from local
zoning restrictions. The presumption has shifted against the state and, presumably, so has the burden of proof.
But see Long Branch Div. v. Cowan, 119 N.J. Super. 306,310,291 A.2d 381, 383 (1972) (plaintiffs bear burden of
proving state acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in selection of site for residential drug rehabilitation center to
support withholding of grant of immunity).
280. The impact on the sum of all state activities should be negligible, since the state can exempt its own
construction projects from local zoning restrictions. See note 217 supra and text accompanying note 281 infra.
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than trivial, there is no reason to believe they are prohibitive. If the state
elects not to undertake an activity because the costs of following Brownfield's
procedures exceed the benefits of undertaking the activity, benefits from the
activity are probably not that great. If the benefits are more than marginal, the
undertaking is worth the costs of complying with Brownfield.
Two further considerations justify imposing the burden of proof on the
state in a judicial proceeding under the balancing test. First, the burden of
proof merely expresses a preference for the set of interests served by zoning;
it does not resolve the immunity issue based solely on zoning interests. The
government unit seeking immunity is provided the opportunity to meet the
burden under the balancing test. In contrast, the eminent domain test and the
governmental-proprietary use distinction resolve the question of immunity
without reference to the weight of opposing interests.
The second consideration supporting the imposition of the burden of
proof on the authority seeking immunity is applicable to situations in which
the authority is the state. State capital improvement projects and land acquisi-
tions are authorized by the legislature, which has the authority to enact direct
grants of immunity for particular state activities. Since, in the final analysis,
the legislature controls the immunity question, "it seems justifiable to place
upon it the burden of reversing a reasonable presumption as to what its intent
would be. ' 28'
Overall, the Brownfield balancing test imposes procedural burdens on the
state that may tend to effectively subordinate the state's interests to the
interests supported by zoning. The degree of subordination, however, is both
minimal and justified. As a result, Brownfield's conceptual difficulties pale in
contrast to the conceptual difficulties of the eminent domain test and the
governmental-proprietary use distinction.
The essential practical difficulty shared by the eminent domain test and
the governmental-proprietary use distinction is one of unjustified overbroad
application. The source of this difficulty in the eminent domain test is the
absence of any requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior
to a judicial resolution of a conflict between local zoning restrictions and the
power of eminent domain. 2 Moreover, overbroad applications of the test
cannot be effectively eliminated because the predictability of outcomes when
the test is applied is a disincentive to good faith efforts at accommodation in
administrative processes.8 3 The governmental-proprietary use distinction
suffers from similar infirmities of overbreadth because it is premised on the
assumption that the unbridled power to select sites for governmental uses is
essential to the fulfillment of government duties, and like the eminent domain
test, it has no exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.8
281. Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49
MINN. L. REV. 284, 298 (1964).
282. See text accompanying notes 106-20 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 121-31 supra.
284. See text accompanying notes 177-82 supra.
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The essence of the overbreadth problem under the eminent domain test
and the governmental-proprietary use distinction is that resort to these tests
prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies eliminates the possibility of
a nonjudicial resolution of the conflict through accommodation.28 5 The judi-
cial tests present all-or-nothing choices. The zoning power is either fully
served and the state's interests completely disserved, or the state's interests
are fully served and the zoning power completely disserved. 286 The admin-
istrative process, by contrast, holds mechanisms for accommodation that may
yield a more balanced result serving a broader range of public interests.289 The
courts should therefore require resort to nonjudicial administrative remedies
that heighten the prospects for accommodation. Brownfield's balancing test is
structured to serve this goal.
Under Brownfield, judicial iesolution of conflicts between local zoning
restrictions and state activities carries the same disadvantages as judicial
resolution under the alternative approaches. Brownfield alters the decision-
making criteria to a balancing of governmental interests28 8 but the ultimate
outcome is still an all-or-nothing proposition that serves one set of public
interests at the expense of another. Balancing is a conceptually stronger basis
for preferring the zoning power or the state's activity,289 but a judicial resolu-
tion of the conflict is still to be avoided where possible because nonjudicial
resolutions by accommodation serve more of the interests implicated in the
conflict.29 Brownfield serves this goal by requiring the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies prior to judicial resolution of conflicts under the balancing
test.29' This requirement, coupled with the absence of highly predictable re-
sults under the balancing test, eliminates disincentives to good faith attempts
at accommodation by the parties to a conflict.292
The absence of highly predictable results under the balancing test is
caused by the test's single difficulty-vagueness. As with the governmental-
proprietary use distinction,293 the balancing test suffers from some degree of
vagueness and lack of predictability. Even in this respect, however, the bal-
ancing test is superior to the governmental-proprietary use distinction be-
cause the vagueness in the balancing test is far less severe.
The governmental-proprietary use distinction is unworkably vague be-
cause "no satisfactory basis for solving the problem whether the activity falls
into one class or other has been evolved." 294 The sole determinative criteria
285. See text accompanying notes 114-20 and 178-82 supra.
286. Id.
287. See text accompanying notes 114-20 supra.
288. See text accompanying notes 187-214 supra.
289. See text accompanying notes 273-77 supra.
290. Even under Brownfield's balancing test, a court must ultimately decide whether zoning restrictions or
the state's activity will prevail.
291. See text accompanying notes 228-50 supra.
292. See text accompanying notes 121-31 supra.
293. See text accompanying notes 171-76 supra.
294. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L.
REV. 910, 938 (1936).
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for distinguishing governmental uses from proprietary uses is that govern-
mental uses are supported by "public necessity. ' ' 295 The public necessity
criteria is so vague that cases relying on the governmental-proprietary use
distinction seem often to state conclusions rather than reason to results.
296
Ohio courts may approach decisions under the balancing test in a similar
fashion if they rely solely on Brownfield's general statement that "the correct
approach ... would be in each instance to weigh the general public purposes
to be served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in
favor of that power which will serve the needs of the greater number of our
citizens." 297 This language, however, is merely a statement of principle, and
Brownfield gives further guidance by specifying considerations relevant to the
balancing decision. The courts are to consider "the essential nature of the
government-owned facility, the impact of the facility upon surrounding prop-
erty, and the alternative locations available for the facility." 298 This specifica-
tion of factors relevant to the balancing decision lends substance to the state-
ment of principle underlying the balancing test, and further clarification is
afforded by an analysis of the cases relied on by Brownfield.299 These clarifi-
cations do not, however, eliminate all the vagueness from the balancing test.
The quantum of vagueness remaining in the balancing test after the clari-
fications afforded by Brownfield's specification of relevant factors and an
analysis of other decisions is partially a function of the absence of a developed
body of case law applying the test and partially a function of the inherent
nature of the test. Vagueness attributable to the absence of case law should
diminish over time as the courts apply the test in a greater number of cases.
Application of the test should, for example, clarify questions regarding
matters such as the scope of a court's responsibility to evaluate alternative
sites for the state's activities,300 but even with these clarifications the test will
retain a certain quantum of vagueness inherent in the nature of
balancing.
Under the balancing test, the outcome of each case will turn on a range of
facts and circumstances, not on a single and clear determinative factor.30' As
a result, judicial outcomes under the balancing test will never be as predict-
able as outcomes under the eminent domain test.302 In the zoning context,
295. See text accompanying notes 138-66 supra.
296. See, e.g., Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 195, 140 N.E.2d 241,243, 159 N.Y.S.2d
145, 148--49 (1957) ("Whatever the view may have been years ago... (garbage collection) must today be
stamped a governmental function.").
297. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
298. Id. at 286-87, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
299. See text accompanying notes 189-206 supra.
300. See text accompanying notes 207-14 supra.
301. The eminent domain test relies solely on the presence or absence of a power of eminent domain to
decide the immunity issue. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. By contrast, decisions under the
Brownfield balancing test are made on the weight of the general public purposes served by the zoning power and
the state activity "in each instance." 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
302. The eminent domain test is inherently "mechanical" in contrast to the balancing test's case by case
approach. Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49
MINN. L. REV. 284, 285 (1964).
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there is a tradeoff between the qualities of the various tests. Results under the
eminent domain test are highly predictable, but predictability is achieved by
relying on an unprincipled distinction between the public interests supported
by the power of eminent domain and the public interests served by the zoning
power.30 3 The balancing test avoids the problem of unprincipled distinctions
because it recognizes the validity of the public interests served by both the
zoning power and state activities and it balances these interests on a case by
case basis. This approach yields less predictable judicial outcomes, but since
a primary value served by predictable results is judicial economy and the
eminent domain test disserves this value by encouraging judicial resolution of
disputes,304 predictability should not count as a reason for preferring the
approach of the eminent domain test. The vagueness and lack of predictability
in the balancing test are the justified costs of the only conceptually sound
approach to resolving conflicts between local zoning restrictions and state
activities.
Gregory W. Stype
303. See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
304. See text accompanying notes 121-31 supra.
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